[ 苏洁澈 ]——(2013-10-24) / 已阅27937次
[25]P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p.742.
[26]P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p. 408.
[27]E. H. Hupkes, Special Bank Resolution and Shareholders’Rights: Balancing Competing Interests, p.23； A. Campbell＆P Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response,pp. 126-128.
[28]S. 99 of the Banking Act 2009；R. Tomasic, “Creating a Template for Banking Insolvency Law Reform after the Collapse of Northern Rock Part 2” （2009） 22 Insolvency Intelligence 83；E. Avgouleas, “ Banking Supervision and the Special Resolu-tion Regime of the Banking Act 2009：the Unfinished Reform” （2009） 4（2） Capital Markets Law Journal 224.
[29]British Bankers’ Association Response to the Tripartite Discussion Paper: Banking Reform-Protecting Depositors, p. 11，ht-tp://www. bba. org. uk/content/1/c6/01/16/48/BBA_Response_to_Tripartite_DP_-_Banking-Reform. pdf，访问时间：2013年1月15日。
[30]美国“联邦存款保险公司”的某些监管性决定可以不举行听证，也不受司法审查。许多东欧国家的银行法也有类似的规定。Art. 21 （5） of the Banks Act 1997 （ Bulgaria）；G. A. Gegenheimer, “Judicial Review of Bank Supervisory Deci-sions in the Former Soviet Republics: The Case of Kyrgyzstan” （2006） 25 Annual Review of Banking＆Financial Law 249.
[31]Yuen Kun Yen v. AG of Hong Kong[1988] AC 175，185；Three Rivers D. C v. Bank of England [2000] 2 W. L. R. 15；Franklin Savings Corp. v. U. S,385 F. 3d 1279 , （10th Cir 2004）．关于金融监管机构的侵权责任制度，参见苏洁澈：《论银行监管机构侵权责任—以银行破产和英美法为例》，《法学家》2011年第1期。
[32]有学者认为，监管机构经常出于自身政治利益考量，而延迟关闭问题银行。J. R. Macey ＆ G. P. Miller, “Kaye, Scho-ler, FIRREA, and The Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank Regu-latory Policy”（1993）66 Southern California Law Review 1133.
[33]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again”，p.477.
[34]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again” ,p.523.
[35]J. R. Macey, G. P. Miller＆R. S. Carnell, Banking Law and Regulation, Aspen Law＆Business, 2001，p. 307；D. G.Mayes,“ Some Rules for Cross-border Banks in Europe” （2009） 10 European Business Organization Law Review 213.
[36]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again”，p.488.
[37]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”，in R. M. Lastra＆H. N. Schiffman（eds.），Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition,Kluwer, 1999，p.111.
[38]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”．p.115.
[39]J. R. Macey, “Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice”（1998） 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 268.
[40]D. A. Skeel, “The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation”（1998） 76 Texas Law Review 729.
[41]H. M. Schooner,“Bank Insolvency Regimes in the United States and the United Kingdom” （2005）18 The Transnational Lawyer 389.
[42]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”，p.114.
[43]M. H. Krimminger, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency in a Changing World: Synergies and Challenges”，IMF Confer-ence, May 28, 2004, http://imf. org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/mk. pdf，访问时间：2012年10月30日。
[44]H. Jackson, “The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies”（1994） 107 Harvard Law Review 507，508-532;关于母公司与子公司的责任问题研究，见余劲松：《跨国公司法律问题专论》，法律出版社2008年版。
[45]H. Jackson, “The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies” ,p. 529；G. N. Olson,“Government Interven-tion: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experience”，p.114.
[46]M. H. Krimminger, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency in a Changing World: Synergies and Challenges' .
[47]FDICv．Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102, 1109 （1st Cir.1986）.
[48]Notes, “Creditors’ Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National Bank”（1986） 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1440；How-ell v. FDIC, 986 F. 2d 569 574（1 st Cir. 1993 ）．
[49]FDIC v. Ernst＆Young, 374 F 3d 579，582 （7th Cir.2004）．
[50]为刺激经济增长，央行长期维持低息政策，从而鼓励了银行的过度放贷；而监管机构则为了避免储蓄机构的破产，修改了通行的会计准则，这导致了大量本应破产的储蓄机构没有及时被破产，最终导致了公共资金更大的损失。关于美国储蓄�；姆⒄购头杀涓�，参见M. S. Tammen, “The Saving and Loan Crisis: Which Train Derailed-Regula-tion or Deposit Insurance?”（1990） 6 Journal of Law and Politics 311，319。
[51]G. J. Beston＆G. G. Kaufman, “FDICIA after Five Years”（1997） 11 （3） The Journal of Economic Perspectives 150.
[52]Hinder v. FDIC 137 F. 3d 148（1998）；Franklin Savings Association v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision 934 F. 2d 1127（10th Cir 1991）；Howell v. FDIC, 986 F. 2d 569 574（1st Cir. 1993 ）；Maccarthy v. FDIC 348 F. 3d 1075（9th Cir 2003）：Golden Pacific Bank Corp. v. FDIC,375 F. 3d 196 （2d Cir. 2004）．
[53]关于英国2009年前的银行管理制度，参见A. Campbell ＆ P. Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response, pp. 120 -145。
[54]相关机构主要是指监管机构，英格兰银行和财政部，某一机构申请破产令应当取得另外一个机构的同意。2009年《银行法》第141条规定法院任命银行临时管理人。
[55]下列国家在其立法中给予了金融监管机构法定的�；ぃ河⒐�、美国、德国、澳大利亚、新加坡、南非等。参见R. S.Delston, Statutory Protection for Banking Supervisors,（1999） World Bank Financial Sector Website Paper No.4，http : /www1. worldbank. org/finance/html/statutory_protection. html，访问时间：2013年3月5日。
[56]IMF, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency, p. 12.
[57]IMF, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency, p. 12.
[58]Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, John Wiley, 1996, p. 309；BIS, Bank Failure in Mature Econ-omies（2004）,Working Paper No. 13. http://www. bis. org/publ/bcbs_wp13. pdf，访问时间：2013年3月5日。
出处:《环球法律评论》2013年第2期
作者单位：中国人民大学法学院
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